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Abstract: The right to healthcare is a socio-economic right. It is posi-
tive in the sense that governments need to provide resources and set 
the priorities for individuals to be able to exercise it. The provision 
of healthcare within complex political entities such as the European 
Union (EU) and Canada is divided between different actors, namely 
the federal government and provinces in the case of Canada, and Eu-
ropean institutions and Member States in the case of the EU. The pa-
per analyses the EU and Canadian legal frameworks and attempts to 
determine the right balance of power between the centre and the con-
stituent parts in order to facilitate the exercise of the right to health-
care.
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1 Introduction
The right to healthcare has several different aspects, or meanings. It 
can mean access to healthcare facilities, which can be limited by phys-
ical obstacles, geographic distances, etc. On the other hand, it can also 
mean access to healthcare services in accordance with uniform, objec-
tive criteria based on clinical need rather than ability to pay. The right to 
healthcare in the latter sense is the focus of this paper. 1
The rights of citizens can be divided into three types: civil, political 
and social. Civil rights are those which are necessary for the exercise 
of individual freedom, such as the right to private property, freedom of 
thought and speech, liberty of the person, and the like. These rights are 
negative in the sense that they generally require the state to refrain from 
intervening, and are forcefully protected by the justice system. Political 
rights include the right to participate in the exercise of political power, 
either to be elected in a body vested with that power, or to elect members 
of such a body. Finally, social rights entail the right to economic welfare 
* Senior Lecturer at Zagreb School of Economics and Management; Assistant Professor at 
the Catholic University of Croatia; Member of the European Parliament, orcid.org/0000-
0002-3592-2967. DOI: 10.3935/cyelp.15.2019.333.
1  This principle can be seen, for example, in Council, ‘Council Conclusions on Common 
values and principles in European Union Health Systems’ (2006).
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and to live a life in accordance with standards which are dominant in a 
given society.2 
The right to healthcare belongs to the last-mentioned type, and can 
be described as a socio-economic right. It is positive in the sense that 
the government has to provide resources and determine priorities for 
individuals to be able to take advantage of it. On the other hand, limited 
resources mean that prioritisation of certain treatments and/or cate-
gories of persons may leave individual patients without access to the 
healthcare they consider necessary for their own wellbeing. Hence, ten-
sions between an individual’s right to a particular healthcare treatment, 
and the priorities of the system to provide resources in areas where they 
would achieve the best results (according to criteria such as cost-effec-
tiveness), may develop. Possibilities for the justice system to intervene 
in these cases are limited, since such interventions would require the 
courts to engage in setting policy priorities which they are ill equipped to 
do. The situation becomes even more complicated in the case of complex 
political entities such as the European Union and Canada, where the 
provision of healthcare is divided between different actors. These actors 
are the federal government and provinces in the case of Canada, and 
European institutions and Member States in the case of the EU.3 Can-
ada and the EU are complex in the sense that the centre (the Canadian 
federal government and the Union institutions) and the constituent parts 
(Canadian provinces and the EU Member States) conduct their policies 
in different areas through an interwoven relationship where their pow-
ers are strongly intertwined and mutually connected. In the described 
circumstances, the division of power between the said actors crucially 
affects the individual’s ability to access healthcare.
The aim of the paper is to analyse the EU and Canadian legal frame-
work and determine whether the role of the ‘centre’ (namely, the Europe-
an Union institutions and the federal government) facilitates or makes 
the exercise of the individual right to healthcare more difﬁ cult. The Ca-
nadian system has been chosen as a comparator for several reasons, 
which will be further explored in the following sections. First, in both 
2  See T Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (CUP 1950) 10-11. On the 
issue of citizenship, see also, for example, P Breiner, ‘Is Social Citizenship Really Outdated? 
T. H. Marshall Revisited’ (Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Albuquerque, 
March 2006); S Greer (ed), Devolution and Social Citizenship in the United Kingdom (Bristol 
Policy Press 2009); S Greer and T Sokol, ‘Rules for Rights: European Law, Health Care and 
Social Citizenship’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 66; C Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Move-
ment and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity’ (2006) 
43 CML Rev 1645; A Rees, ‘TH Marshall and the Progress of Citizenship’ in M Bulmer and A 
Rees (eds), Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of TH Marshall (Routledge 2016).
3  See on the general overview of EU health law and policy, for example, T Hervey, C Young 
and L Bishop (eds), Research Handbook on EU Health Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 2017).
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systems, healthcare remains a primary competence of the constituent 
parts, with an increasingly important role played by the centre in recent 
years. Second, courts have signiﬁ cantly contributed to the latest trends. 
Third, there exist different approaches of the two systems in the way 
these powers are divided, a fact which can offer a new perspective con-
cerning the EU constitutional setup.
The paper ﬁ rst analyses elements of the EU legal framework dealing 
with healthcare and the division of power between the EU and the Mem-
ber States in this regard. It then analyses the Canadian legal framework, 
focusing on the division of power regarding healthcare provision between 
the federal government and the provinces. The paper then compares the 
cases of EU and Canada and tries to determine the right balance of pow-
er between the centre and the constituent parts in order to facilitate the 
exercise of the right to healthcare. 
2 The EU constitutional framework
The primary sources of European Union law are the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU 
Charter) and the general principles of EU law. According to Article 6 
TEU, the EU recognises the rights, freedoms and principles prescribed 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 De-
cember 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which 
have the same legal value as the Treaties. Charter provisions do not ex-
tend the powers of the Union as prescribed by the Treaties. Furthermore, 
fundamental rights, as protected by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and as they 
derive from the constitutional traditions which are common to the Mem-
ber States, constitute general principles of EU law.
According to Article 5 TEU, Union powers (competences) are limited 
by the principle of conferral. This principle means that the EU may act 
only within those powers which have been conferred upon the Union by 
its Member States via the TEU and TFEU to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties. The use of Union competences is subject to the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the EU, in the 
areas which are not within the exclusive powers of the Union, may act 
only when the objective of the said action cannot be sufﬁ ciently achieved 
by the EU Member States, but can be better achieved at the EU level. The 
principle of proportionality means that EU actions will not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the Treaty objectives.4
4  On the general principles of EU law, see, for example, K Lenaerts and J Gutiérrez-Fons, 
‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ (2010) 47 CML 
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The European Union has several different types of powers. First, 
there are the exclusive powers. According to Article 2 TFEU, when the 
Treaties give the EU exclusive power (competence) in a given area, only 
the EU may adopt legally binding acts in this area. The Member States 
may act only if they are speciﬁ cally granted that power by the EU, or they 
may act to implement the acts of the EU. Exclusive powers of the Union 
are enumerated in Article 3 TFEU and cover six areas, mainly concern-
ing trade and monetary policy. Concurrent (shared between the EU and 
the Member States) powers mean that the Member States may adopt 
legally binding acts if the EU has not done so in a certain area. The Mem-
ber States are allowed to exercise their power when the Union decides 
to cease exercising its power in the said area. Concurrency covers most 
areas of Union action, ranging from the internal market free trade provi-
sions, to social policy and public health, as stipulated by Article 4 TFEU. 
Next, according to Article 2 TFEU, the EU has powers to coordinate the 
economic and employment policies of the EU. Finally, the EU has the 
power to coordinate, support or supplement the policies of the Member 
States in certain ﬁ elds, without harmonising national legislation. The 
latter areas include the protection and improvement of human health, 
pursuant to Article 6 TFEU.
A crucial area of European Union action is the internal market, 
which falls within the area of concurrent powers. The power to regulate 
the said ﬁ eld, through the approximation of national laws, is interpret-
ed rather broadly, arising whenever there is an issue existing in several 
EU Member States. An example of such an approach can be seen in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU, concerning the prohibi-
tion of tobacco advertising.5 According to the Court, the mere ﬁ nding of 
certain differences between Member States’ rules is not enough to justify 
EU legislative action. However, the Union may act when there are dis-
parities between the Member States’ laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions which obstruct the freedoms of movement (of goods, persons, 
services, establishment and capital) across national borders and thus 
directly affect the functioning of the EU internal market. Furthermore, 
EU legislative action is possible if its objective is to prevent the emergence 
of some future obstacles to trade due to different developments of Mem-
ber States’ laws. The emergence of the said obstacles must be likely and 
the EU legislative measure must be designed to prevent it. Additionally:
Rev 1629. See also A Estella de Noriega, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique 
(OUP 2002) and T Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 
16 European Law Journal 158. 
5  See Case C-380/03 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union ECLI:EU:C:2006:772.
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It follows from the foregoing that when there are obstacles to trade, or 
it is likely that such obstacles will emerge in the future, because the 
Member States have taken, or are about to take, divergent measures 
with respect to a product or a class of products, which bring about dif-
ferent levels of protection and thereby prevent the product or products 
concerned from moving freely within the Community, Article 95 EC 
authorises the Community legislature to intervene by adopting appro-
priate measures, in compliance with Article 95(3) EC and with the legal 
principles mentioned in the EC Treaty or identiﬁ ed in the case-law, in 
particular the principle of proportionality.6
Although the Court of Justice stated that the mere ﬁ nding of dis-
parities between Member States is not enough for the Union to act, but 
that real or potential obstacles to trade must exist, the existence of the 
said obstacles has been interpreted very broadly by the Court. Besides:
Recourse to Article 95 EC as a legal basis does not presuppose the 
existence of an actual link with free movement between the Member 
States in every situation covered by the measure founded on that basis. 
As the Court has previously pointed out, to justify recourse to Article 
95 EC as the legal basis what matters is that the measure adopted on 
that basis must actually be intended to improve the conditions for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.7 
In the particular case, EU legislation regulated media with no con-
nection to the EU cross-border market. The existence of obstacles to 
trade was also not based on any concrete evidence, but was primarily 
deduced from the fact that certain Member States regulate advertising 
of tobacco more restrictively than others (and the EU even strengthened 
those limitations). It has also been stated in the literature that ‘the con-
sequent dynamic in favour of an EU regulatory competence that is in 
principle limited but in practice truly broad is evident’.8 In this sense, it 
is possible to say that the tendency of shifting the balance of regulatory 
power from the national to the EU level can be observed. 
Of course, the case law is still evolving. A recent example is Czech Re-
public v European Parliament and Council concerning Directive 2017/853 
adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU which limits the trade of ﬁ re-
arms. Here, Advocate General Sharpston in her recent opinion stated that 
the test is whether, taking into account its content and taken as a whole, 
6  ibid, para 41. Article 95 EC is the current Article 114 TFEU.
7  ibid, para 80.
8  See S Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Ad-
vertising: How the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German 
Law Journal 839. See also, for example, Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for 
Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2002:741.
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the directive in question eliminates obstacles to free movement and/or 
prevents the emergence of future obstacles. The Advocate General in the 
concrete case found the Czech Republic’s plea that the directive aims at 
regulating public safety and security and not to eliminate obstacles to 
the internal market unfounded. The argument was that the directive’s 
primary purpose was to eliminate obstacles to free trade by introducing 
harmonised rules to ensure that Member States do not need to take indi-
vidual (possibly disparate) action. In her opinion, the directive promotes 
the objectives of the internal market whilst taking into account the need 
to enhance provision for public safety. However, the actual limitations to 
the free movement of goods that the directive purportedly removes are 
presumed by the Advocate General and are not concretely proven. This 
approach seems to be in line with the case law shifting the balance of 
power towards the EU, but one has to wait for the actual judgment to see 
whether the Court will follow suit.9
3 EU healthcare system(s) 
The ﬁ rst thing to notice about the European Union healthcare sys-
tem is that it is not a single system at all. As prescribed by Article 168 
TFEU, the EU respects: 
the responsibilities of the Member States for the deﬁ nition of their 
health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health servic-
es and medical care. The responsibilities of the Member States shall 
include the management of health services and medical care and the 
allocation of the resources assigned to them.
Union action must be focused on complementing the national ac-
tions and policies in different areas, such as public health protection, 
epidemics, etc. It is also prescribed that the EU will encourage coopera-
tion between Member States, especially concerning the complementarity 
of healthcare services in border areas. Incentive measures which the EU 
may enact in order to protect and improve human health may not include 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Union Member States.
One exception concerns medicines regulation. Here, according to 
Article 168 TFEU, the EU may enact the following: rules setting high 
standards of quality and safety of organs and substances of human or-
igin, blood and blood derivatives; rules in the veterinary and phytosan-
itary ﬁ elds which have as their direct objective the protection of public 
health; and rules setting high standards of quality and safety for medic-
inal products and devices for medical use. In practice, the EU regulates 
9  See Case C-482/17 Czech Republic v European Parliament Council of the European Union, 
Opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 39-76.
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the placing of medicines on the EU market. This includes manufactur-
ing, wholesaling, advertising, clinical trials, supervision, etc. The Euro-
pean Medicines Agency is tasked with evaluating medicines according 
to safety standards, while the ﬁ nal marketing approval is given by the 
European Commission. Medicines must also be approved by the Mem-
ber States in order to be covered by their health insurance systems, 
whose spending covers the majority of cost of medicines in the European 
Union.10 
As noted when mentioning Article 168 TFEU, the Member States are 
responsible for organising and delivering (including ﬁ nancing) health-
care to the population, which they conduct through their (social securi-
ty) health insurance systems. The health insurance systems of the EU 
are recognised as a central part of Europe’s high levels of social protec-
tion, contributing to social cohesion and social justice as well as to its 
sustainable development. They are based on the health values of uni-
versality, solidarity, access to good quality care and equity. Universality 
means that access to healthcare is not prohibited to anyone; solidarity is 
connected with the ﬁ nancial arrangement of Member States’ health sys-
tems and the need to ensure accessibility of healthcare provision to all; 
equity means equal access based on need, regardless of ethnicity, age, 
gender, ability to pay or social status.11 Healthcare resources of the Mem-
ber States’ systems are in this sense crucial for the delivery of healthcare 
in the EU. The possibilities of the EU to harmonise these national health 
insurance systems is practically non-existent. One such possibility is 
prescribed by Article 153 TFEU, which provides that the EU may adopt, 
in several areas including social security (via directives), the minimum 
10  See, on these issues, European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 726/2004 of 31 
March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of 
medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines 
Agency [2004] OJ L136/1. See also European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/83/
EC of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human 
use [2001] OJ L311/67 and European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 536/2014 
of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use and repealing Di-
rective 2001/20/EC [2014] OJ L158/1. On the national approval process for the coverage 
of medicines, see Council Directive 89/105/EEC relating to the transparency of measures 
regulating the prices of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope 
of national health insurance systems [1989] OJ L40/8. See also J Borg et al, ‘Strengthening 
and Rationalizing Pharmacovigilance in the EU: Where is Europe Heading to?’ (2011) 34 
Drug Safety 187; G Permanand, E Mossialos and M McKee, ‘Regulating Medicines in Eu-
rope: The European Medicines Agency, Marketing Authorisation, Transparency and Phar-
macovigilance’ (2006) 6 Clinical Medicine 87; J Regnstrom et al, ‘Factors Associated with 
Success of Market Authorisation Applications for Pharmaceutical Drugs Submitted to the 
European Medicines Agency’ (2010) 66 European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 39; S 
Vogler et al, ‘Pharmaceutical Policies in European Countries in Response to the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis’ (2011) 4 Southern Med Review 69.
11  Council (n 1).
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requirements for gradual implementation, limited to supporting and 
complementing the national activities. However, the said measures in 
the area of social security may only be enacted through a consensus of 
the Member States in the Council, meaning there is not much chance of 
adopting them (and none of them have been adopted yet). 
As can be observed, explicit legal bases concerning healthcare and 
social security in the Treaties are rather limited in scope. On the other 
hand, EU legal rules which inﬂ uence national health insurance systems 
are based on the provision of the TFEU on facilitating free movement. 
One of these legal bases is Article 21 TFEU which makes it possible 
to adopt measures concerning social security or social protection for 
economically non-active persons to facilitate the free movement of EU 
citizens across national borders. Another legal basis is Article 48 TFEU 
which aims at facilitating the free movement of workers between Mem-
ber States. The latter provision has traditionally been the legal basis 
for adopting rules on the coordination of national social security sys-
tems. These EU rules aim at protecting social security rights (including 
healthcare) for migrant workers who come into contact with different 
national systems due to working and/or living in several Member States. 
The crucial principles of the coordination system concerning access to 
healthcare are equal treatment (prohibition of discrimination of other 
Member States’ nationals) and the designation of one applicable legis-
lation that migrants are subjected to. These rules, inter alia, contain 
the right to obtain authorisation from the state of insurance for (social) 
health insurance coverage of elective healthcare in another Member 
State. The authorisation is given if the treatment in question is provided 
by the legislation of the Member State of (social) health insurance and 
if the insured person cannot be given such treatment in the state of in-
surance within a time limit which is medically justiﬁ able, considering 
the person’s state of health and the probable course of illness.12 Here, 
one can see that the EU essentially imposes certain market-oriented 
regulatory requirements on national health insurance systems, while 
the maintenance and ﬁ nancing of these social insurance systems is left 
to the Member States.
12  See Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1. Another historically 
important legal basis is the current Art 352 TFEU which provides that, if action by the EU 
is necessary, within the framework of the policies deﬁ ned in the Treaties, to attain one of 
the Treaty objectives, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the European Commission and after gaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, will adopt the appropriate measures.
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4 Free movement of services 
The previous sections have focused on the division of powers be-
tween the European Union and the Member States generally and spe-
ciﬁ cally in the ﬁ eld of healthcare. However, the crucial legal basis which 
has, in practice, had an important inﬂ uence on the individual’s access to 
healthcare in the EU concerns the free movement of services. According 
to the current Article 56 TFEU, all restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the EU are prohibited concerning nationals of Member 
States who are established in a Member State other than the state of the 
person for whom the services are intended. Crucial case law on the said 
provision concerns the right to obtain healthcare outside one’s Member 
State of social health insurance under the coverage of that health insur-
ance. This case law has developed the right to socially covered elective 
cross-border healthcare in parallel to the existing system of social se-
curity coordination. The said jurisprudence has, in the meantime, been 
codiﬁ ed through another piece of EU secondary legislation, the Patients’ 
Rights Directive, with harmonisation of the internal market as the pri-
mary legal basis for adoption.13
The ﬁ rst notable decision, Kohll, in which the Court of Justice of 
the EU tackled the right to access cross-border healthcare was rendered 
in 1998. The dispute was between a Luxembourg national (Mr Kohll) 
and his Luxembourg social health insurance concerning a request by 
a doctor established in Luxembourg for authorisation for his daughter, 
who was a minor, to receive orthodontist treatment in Germany. The 
refusal of authorisation was challenged before Luxembourg courts, and 
the Court of Cassation referred the case to the Court of Justice for a pre-
liminary ruling.14 
The Court concluded that the freedom to provide services is appli-
cable to the cases of persons who seek to obtain (social) health insur-
ance coverage of medical treatment in another EU Member State. Next, 
it turned to the question of whether imposing mandatory prior authori-
13  See Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the ap-
plication of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45 (Patients’ Rights 
Directive). The Directive and the case law have been extensively analysed in the literature. 
See, for example, S de La Rosa, ‘The Directive on Cross-border Healthcare or the Art of 
Codifying Complex Case Law’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 15; M Peeters, ‘Free Movement of Patients: 
Directive 2011/24 on the Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare’ (2012) 
19 European Journal of Health Law 29; K Raptopoulou, ‘The Directive on Cross-border 
Health Care: Signalling the Coordination or the Harmonisation of Public Health Systems?’ 
(2012) European Journal of Social Law 193; G Strban, ‘Patient Mobility in the European 
Union: Between Social Security Coordination and Free Movement of Services’ (2013) 14 
ERA Forum 391; J van de Gronden et al (eds), Health Care and EU Law (TMC Asser Press 
2011). 
14  See Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie ECLI:EU:C:1998:171.
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sation, as a requirement for obtaining the said coverage, is a restriction 
of the free movement of cross-border services. Here, the Court stated 
that, although the described national rules do not deprive insured per-
sons of the possibility of approaching a provider of healthcare services 
established in another EU Member State, they do nevertheless make re-
imbursement of the costs of those services subject to prior authorisa-
tion, and deny reimbursement to persons who have not obtained the 
authorisation. On the other hand, costs incurred in the Member State of 
insurance are not subject to that authorisation. Therefore, the rules in 
question deter insured persons from accessing healthcare providers es-
tablished in another Member State and constitute, for the providers and 
their patients, a barrier to the freedom to provide (and receive) services.15
Then the Court analysed the possibilities to justify such a restric-
tion to free movement on the basis of public interest, as provided by the 
current Article 52 TFEU and the case law. In order to be justiﬁ ed, the 
national measures in question must be suitable for achieving the stated 
objective. Next, they must be necessary to achieve the said objective and 
must represent the least possible restriction on free movement. Finally, 
proportionality stricto sensu between the measure’s effects and its objec-
tive must exist.16 In Kohll, the Court concluded that the freedom to re-
ceive health treatment in another Member State does not endanger pub-
lic health, whose protection was stated as justiﬁ cation for the measure 
in question by Luxembourg. The reasoning was that the conditions for 
taking up and pursuing the profession of doctor and dentist have been 
regulated by several coordinating or harmonising directives of the EU. 
Therefore, doctors and dentists established in other Member States must 
be given the same guarantees as doctors and dentists established on the 
national territory of the state of insurance, for the purposes of the free 
provision of services. Additionally, Luxembourg tried to justify its prior 
authorisation requirement by the necessity to provide a balanced and 
accessible healthcare service. The Court did not accept this justiﬁ cation, 
since there was no proof that the rules in question were indispensable for 
the maintenance of an essential health treatment facility or service on 
national territory. Imposing prior authorisation for such treatments was, 
thus, considered contrary to the TFEU provisions on the free movement 
of services.17
Subsequent case law has reﬁ ned and further explained the ap-
proach of the Court of Justice to the right to cross-border healthcare. It 
has also expanded that right to healthcare systems which are free-of-
15  Kohll (n 14) paras 31-35.
16  Harbo (n 4) 165.
17  Kohll (n 14) paras 37-53.
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charge at the point of delivery, unlike the system in Luxembourg based 
on the reimbursement of expenses.18 One well-known decision in this 
regard is Watts, related to the UK’s National Health Service. The case 
was about Mrs Watts, residing in the UK (and covered by its health sys-
tem) who was refused authorisation to obtain a hip replacement abroad. 
According to the applicable rules on coordination of social security sys-
tems, authorisation for the coverage of treatment abroad could only be 
given when the treatment in question was covered by the legislation of 
the state of health insurance and such treatment could not be provid-
ed in that state within the time normally necessary for obtaining the 
treatment in question (without undue delay). The national authorities 
considered that Mrs Watts could receive treatment in a local hospital 
within the government’s NHS Plan targets and therefore ‘without undue 
delay’. In practice, this meant she would have to wait about a year for her 
hip replacement. Mrs Watts then obtained the treatment in France and 
asked for reimbursement from the UK and the case ﬁ nally went to the 
Court of Justice of the EU.19
On the issue of undue delay and waiting lists, the Court concluded 
the following:
It follows that, where the delay arising from such waiting lists appears 
to exceed in the individual case concerned an acceptable period hav-
ing regard to an objective medical assessment of all the circumstances 
of the situation and the clinical needs of the person concerned, the 
competent institution may not refuse the authorisation sought on the 
grounds of the existence of those waiting lists, an alleged distortion 
of the normal order of priorities linked to the relative urgency of the 
cases to be treated, the fact that the hospital treatment provided un-
der the national system in question is free-of-charge, the duty to make 
available speciﬁ c funds to reimburse the cost of treatment provided in 
another Member State and/or a comparison between the cost of that 
treatment and that of equivalent treatment in the competent Member 
State.20
It can be seen from the quoted paragraph that the individual’s right 
to healthcare has priority over the general need for planning and priori-
tising healthcare resources when deciding on the issue of prior authori-
18  The ﬁ rst judgment on a system not based on reimbursement was Case C-157/99 BSM 
Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ ECLI:EU:C:2001:404. One important element is 
that the case law has recognised that the prior authorisation requirement can be justiﬁ ed 
for hospital treatments and treatment involving major medical equipment. See, for example, 
Case C-512/08 European Commission v French Republic ECLI:EU:C:2010:579, paras 26-44.
19  See Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary 
Care Trust ECLI:EU:C:2006:325.
20  Watts (n 19) para 120.
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sation. The Court here does not even consider a less restrictive alterna-
tive which is the usual form of the proportionality test it uses. In the case 
of literally applying such a test, the question would be if the national 
resource planning concerns can be achieved by an authorisation sys-
tem and waiting lists which are less cumbersome for patients. If this is 
impossible, the Member State in question should be allowed to retain its 
system, although an individual patient might wait longer than is ‘accept-
able having regard to an objective medical assessment’, whatever that 
means. The Court, however, has not utilised the usual proportionality 
test, thereby giving strong preference to individual needs when deter-
mining whether to grant authorisation or not.
Apart from waiting lists as a means of healthcare planning, another 
issue which has been tackled by the Court of Justice concerns the right 
of a Member State of insurance to deﬁ ne the basket of health services it 
covers. The crucial decision in this respect was rendered in Geraets-Smits, 
the ﬁ rst to deal with a beneﬁ ts-in-kind healthcare system. In this case, 
a person insured in the Netherlands suffering from Parkinson’s disease 
underwent treatment in Germany and asked for reimbursement from 
the Dutch health insurance. Reimbursement was refused, partly on the 
basis that the clinical method in question was not regarded as normal 
treatment within the relevant professional circles and was therefore not 
covered by the Dutch health insurance legislation. The case also went 
to the Court of Justice, which concluded that the Netherlands’ legisla-
tion did not contain a detailed list of healthcare treatments covered by 
domestic health insurance, but referred to treatments ‘normal in the 
professional circles concerned’ instead. According to the Court, ‘only an 
interpretation on the basis of what is sufﬁ ciently tried and tested by 
international medical science can be regarded as satisfying’. In other 
words, Member States which broadly deﬁ ne what they cover by referring 
to standards recognised by the medical profession have to cover foreign 
treatments which are not recognised by the medical profession in their 
own territory.21
Of course, it is hard to speak of some universal standard of the 
medical profession, since such standards are not harmonised at the EU 
level, let alone at the global level. There can be multiple reasons why a 
certain treatment is considered standard in one country and not in an-
other, ranging from the technological (lack of relevant clinical testing) to 
the ethical (in vitro fertilisation or abortion, for instance). The approach of 
the Court of Justice stimulates countries to limit the cover by prescrib-
ing in detail the content of their health insurance baskets. This approach 
would reduce the ﬂ exibility of the system and make it harder to keep up 
21  See Geraets-Smits (n 18).
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with rapid changes in medical technology. It can be seen that the Court 
of Justice has limited the Member States’ possibilities of making fund-
ing and rationing decisions in accordance with domestic resources and 
priorities. 
This approach has generally been taken over by the Patients’ Rights 
Directive. For example, it is stated in its preamble that, if the national 
legislation does not specify precisely the treatment method applied but 
deﬁ nes types of treatment more broadly, a Member State should not re-
fuse prior authorisation or reimbursement on the grounds that the treat-
ment method is not available in its territory, but should assess whether 
the treatment in question corresponds to the beneﬁ ts provided for in 
its legislation.22 Thereby, the Directive provides an incentive for Member 
States to deﬁ ne their coverage in a more detailed and rigid legislative 
manner in order to be able to remain competent for deﬁ ning their sys-
tems’ priorities. It should be mentioned that the Court has limited cer-
tain aspects of cross-border healthcare in the more recent case law, an 
approach taken over and expanded by the Directive. This has been the 
case, for instance, by allowing the prior authorisation requirement to 
be justiﬁ ed for hospital treatments and treatment involving major med-
ical equipment,23 thereby ‘protecting the organisational structures and 
capacities of national health systems, and their ﬁ nancial viability’, as 
stated by Hervey.24 On the other hand, the question of deﬁ ning coverage 
still remains contentious, as shown above.
5 Coordination of ﬁ scal and economic policies 
Another important aspect of the EU legal framework inﬂ uencing 
the right to healthcare concerns coordination of the ﬁ scal and macro-
economic policies of the Member States, including caps on their public 
expenditure. The key instrument which sets these limitations is the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact which aims to maintain the stability of the EU 
Economic and Monetary Union. The Pact has set thresholds of 60% of 
GDP relating to public debt and 3% of GDP relating to annual govern-
ment deﬁ cit. If the said thresholds are breached, the Council may initiate 
a special Excessive Deﬁ cit Procedure which may result in ﬁ nancial pen-
alties for the concerned Member State. 25
22  See Preamble to the Patients’ Rights Directive (n 13) para 34. 
23  See Commission v France (n 18) paras 94-98 and the Patients’ Rights Directive (n 13) 
Art 8.
24  See T Hervey, ‘Telling Stories about European Union Health Law: The Emergence of a 
New Field of Law’ (2017) 15 Comparative European Politics 352. 
25  See Art 126 TFEU and Protocol 12 on the excessive deﬁ cit procedure. See also Council 
Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budget-
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The economic crisis which started in 2008 has put pressure on Eu-
ropean Union Member States to give strong powers to the institutions of 
the EU, especially those dealing with ﬁ scal issues, regarding the control 
of national economic and ﬁ scal policies, including healthcare spending. 
The strongest mechanism of control, involving the European Central 
Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund 
(the Troika) has focused on those countries which belong to the Econom-
ic and Monetary Union (Eurozone). The Eurozone countries, which need 
ﬁ nancial assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the Eu-
ropean Union, must fulﬁ l certain conditions. The said conditions include 
reforms in social and economic policies set by Memorandums of Under-
standing (MoUs) concluded between the Member States and those insti-
tutions. These Memorandums are based on the intergovernmental Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism established by the countries of the Eurozone 
and are not part of internal EU law. This mechanism has generally taken 
over the tasks previously fulﬁ lled by the European Financial Stabilisa-
tion Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facility (which 
are still in existence) and represents a strong instrument for ensuring 
countries’ compliance. The European Commission primarily monitors 
whether the countries fulﬁ l the conditions which are set by the MoUs. 
Non-compliance of the countries concerned may result in penalties and 
stricter conditions for future assistance.26 
As far as other EU Member States are concerned, crucial instru-
ments are determined through the framework of the European Semester 
for economic policy coordination. Within the Semester, there is a ‘soft’ 
governance framework regarding Member States’ social and employment 
policies. This framework has complemented the strong coordination of 
national ﬁ scal and macroeconomic policies established by the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The Semester starts in November of each year when 
the European Commission determines Union priorities in terms of job 
ary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [1997] OJ L209/1 
and Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deﬁ cit procedure [1997] OJ L209/6. See also T Sokol and 
N MijatoviÊ, ‘EU Health Law and Policy and the Eurozone Crisis’ in T Hervey, C Young and 
L Bishop (eds), Research Handbook on EU Health Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 2017) 292.
26  See Art 136 TFEU and Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism between 
the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, 
the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Malta, the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slo-
vak Republic and the Republic of Finland. See also Art 122 TFEU, European Financial Sta-
bility Facility Consolidated Articles of Association and Council Regulation (EU) 407/2010 of 
11 May 2010 establishing a European ﬁ nancial stabilisation mechanism [2010] OJ L118/1. 
Under the said rules, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism may provide assis-
tance to all EU Member States.
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creation and growth for the following year. On the basis of the Guidelines 
which are made by the Council, EU Member States prepare National Re-
form Programmes for the year to come. These programmes are reviewed 
by the European Commission which makes Country Reports for each of 
the Member States, analysing their social and economic policies. These 
are followed by the Council’s Country-Speciﬁ c Recommendations (CSR). 
Strict procedures for the prevention, detection and correction of macro-
economic imbalances have also been established by Union legislation to 
ensure national implementation. Thus, monitoring of EU Member States’ 
economic and ﬁ scal policies has been strengthened. The countries need 
to respect concrete deadlines for correcting their deﬁ cits in a sustainable 
manner. Non-complying Member States may be given policy warnings 
which are endorsed by the Council and can result in ﬁ nancial  penalties.27
In what way have the EU instruments of economic policy and ﬁ scal 
coordination inﬂ uenced national healthcare systems and the right to 
healthcare in the Member States? It can be observed that in countries 
where the EU and the other mentioned institutions had a bigger role 
to play (Portugal, Ireland and Greece), through Memorandums of Un-
derstanding, privatisation and cost-containment became priorities. In 
Ireland, for example, several co-payments have been newly introduced 
or increased, including those for prescribed medicines. In Greece, an 
EUR 25 admission fee and an additional EUR 1 payment (on top of the 
existing 25% co-payment) for prescriptions were introduced in 2014. In 
addition, the number of beds provided through the public system has 
been slashed by more than 10%, and for-proﬁ t ﬁ nancing of hospitals has 
been expanded. In countries where the role of the EU has been moderate, 
healthcare reforms have focused on a ‘changing healthcare mix’. There 
was a shift of control powers from insurance funds either towards the 
27  See Council Regulation (EC) 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Pro-
tocol on the excessive deﬁ cit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (Codiﬁ ed version) [2009] OJ L145/1; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 No-
vember 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ 
L306/41; European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area [2011] OJ 
L306/1; European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1174/2011 of 16 November 
2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro 
area [2011] OJ L306/8; European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 of 
16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] 
OJ L306/25; European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 472/2013 of 21 May 2013 
on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro 
area experiencing or threatened with serious difﬁ culties with respect to their ﬁ nancial sta-
bility [2013] OJ L140/1; and European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 473/2013 
of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans 
and ensuring the correction of excessive deﬁ cit of the Member States in the euro area [2013] 
OJ L140/11. See also R Baeten and B Vanhercke, ‘Inside the Black Box: The EU’s Economic 
Surveillance of National Healthcare Systems’ (2017) 15 Comparative European Politics 483. 
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market (the Netherlands and Italy), or the State (Germany and France), 
along with some level of privatisation of healthcare service provision. In 
the Member States where the EU inﬂ uence has been weakest, such as 
the UK, Sweden and Lithuania (some of them are not members of the 
Eurozone), reforms have focused on systemic reorganisation, based on 
domestic policy considerations.28 Therefore, where the EU inﬂ uence on 
national healthcare policies has been strong, the emphasis has been on 
ﬁ scal consolidation, and not on ensuring individual access to healthcare.
6 Canadian constitutional framework 
At the outset, the Canadian constitutional framework, in terms of 
the division of power between the federal level and the provinces, sig-
niﬁ cantly differs from the system set up by the TEU and TFEU. The ﬁ rst 
difference, of course, is that the Canadian Constitution consists of sev-
eral codiﬁ ed acts and uncodiﬁ ed traditions and practices.29 On the other 
hand, the Union constitutional framework, as described in the previous 
sections, is based on international treaties ratiﬁ ed by the Member States, 
the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the gen-
eral principles of EU law. Second, most policy areas in the EU remain 
concurrent, or shared, between the Union and the Member States. In 
Canada, conversely, concurrency can be seen basically as an exception 
to the general rule. Section 91 of the Constitution Act 1867 enumerates 
exclusive competences of the Parliament of Canada in great detail. These 
powers cover different areas, ranging from issues such as public debt 
and the regulation of trade and commerce, to unemployment insurance 
and family law. Section 92 of the Constitution Act 1867 enumerates ex-
28  See F Stamati and R Baeten, ‘Varieties of Healthcare Reform: Understanding EU Lever-
age’ in D Natali and B Vanhercke (eds), Social Policy in the European Union: State of Play 
2015 (European Trade Union Institute 2015) 209-210. On Ireland, see the Health Act 1970, 
section 59 (1A−C). Another element which should be mentioned is that the number of per-
sons who have full eligibility for public healthcare increased from 30% to around 43% of 
the Irish population between 2007 and 2013. Additionally, there has been a 70% increase 
since 2005. This is important because a person’s eligibility depends on a means test, which 
means that there has been a big increase in the number of persons who are unable to pay 
for their healthcare without undue hardship. See Health Act 1970, section 45. See also, on 
this issue, F Paolucci, Health Care Financing and Insurance (Springer 2011) 35; A Nolan 
and B Nolan, ‘Eligibility for Free GP Care, “Need” and GP Visiting in Ireland’ (2008) 9 Euro-
pean Journal of Health Economics 157. In Greece, the overall government deﬁ cit declined 
by 3.6% in 2014, from double-digit ﬁ gures in the previous years. See EUROSTAT, ‘General 
Government Deﬁ cit (-) and Surplus (+) − Annual Data’. 
29  It is stated in the Preamble to the Constitution Act 1867: ‘Whereas the Provinces of Can-
ada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united 
into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom...’. Since the Consti-
tution of the UK is uncodiﬁ ed, it can be derived that the same underlying principle applies 
also to Canada.
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clusive competences of the provinces, including, for example, ‘the estab-
lishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals, asylums, chari-
ties, and eleemosynary institutions in and for the province, other than 
marine hospitals’. Section 95 stipulates agriculture and immigration as 
concurrent between the federal level and the provinces. Rules enacted 
by the provinces have effect as long as they are not contrary to an Act of 
Parliament of Canada. 
Even though the constitutional division of powers seems pretty 
straightforward, both the federal government and the provinces have 
engaged in policy activities not clearly deﬁ ned by the constitutional pro-
visions. Additionally, the federal level has assumed a more active role in 
providing social services, such as healthcare and pensions, which have 
traditionally been assigned to the provinces.30 Furthermore, the exclu-
sive power of the federal government to regulate trade and commerce, 
which might be seen as similar to the TFEU free movement provisions, 
has raised questions on where the federal power stops and the provincial 
one begins. In this sense, the Supreme Court of Canada has relatively 
recently stated that it has evolved into a ﬂ exible point of view towards 
federalism ‘that accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and encourages 
intergovernmental cooperation − an approach that can be described as 
the ‘dominant tide’ of modern federalism’. This dominant tide means that 
the Court rejects an approach of rigidly and formalistically demarking 
powers of the federal government and provinces, in favour of accommo-
dating cooperative intergovernmental efforts.31 Furthermore, the Court 
has stated that an issue must be ‘genuinely national in importance and 
scope’ for it to be within the legislative powers of the federal govern-
ment concerning trade and commerce. Genuine national importance 
and scope do not exist solely because the issue at hand exists in all the 
Canadian provinces, or because some of its aspects have a national di-
mension. For the federal level to regulate, there must be a problem which 
provinces cannot solve on their own (either jointly, or individually).32 
30  See, for example, Canada Pension Plan RSC, 1985, c C-8. See also T Hueglin, ‘Treaty 
Federalism as a Model of Policy Making: Comparing Canada and the European Union’ 
(2013) 56 Canadian Public Administration 193.
31  See Reference re Securities Act [2011] 3 SCR 837, paras 57-58.
32  ibid. This is one of the ﬁ ve criteria for federal legislative intervention set by the Court in 
General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing [1989] 1 SCR 641: (1) the legislation 
in question must be part of a general regulatory scheme; (2) the scheme must be contin-
uously monitored by a regulatory agency; (3) the legislation must be related to trade as a 
whole and not with a speciﬁ c industry; (4) the legislation should be such that the provinces 
jointly or individually would be constitutionally incapable of enacting; and (5) the failure to 
include one or more provinces or localities would jeopardise the successful operation of the 
scheme in question in other parts of Canada. This is not a closed list and absence of one of 
the stated conditions is not crucial for the federal legislative power to exist.
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Generally, the Court emphasises concepts like balance and cooper-
ation when determining the limits of federal regulatory power. Despite 
the concept of ‘cooperative federalism’ which encourages cooperation be-
tween the federal and the provincial level, the constitutional limitations 
which underlie the division of powers between the federal government 
and the provinces must still be respected. This ‘dominant tide’ of con-
stitutional federalism, however strong, ‘cannot sweep designated powers 
out to sea, nor erode the constitutional balance inherent in the Canadian 
federal state’. Legislation’s primary focus on local concerns means it can-
not be within the power of the federal level. This is especially the case in 
areas such as securities, where different provinces have different focuses 
and specialisations, as evidenced by data (for example, around half of 
Ontario’s securities market is linked to large ﬁ nancial services compa-
nies, while Alberta is the dominant national market for oil and gas, etc).33
The approach by the Supreme Court seems to be more restrained in 
terms of broad interpretation of the federal legislative power encroaching 
upon the provinces’ constitutional position when compared to the EU. As 
observed when analysing the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, Union 
competence to regulate the internal market, by way of approximating na-
tional laws, is sometimes interpreted as existing whenever there is an is-
sue which exists in several EU Member States. The standard of genuine 
national scope and importance used by the Supreme Court seems to be 
stricter and, at least partly, based on some concrete evidence. The latter 
standard requires that national legislation must be qualitatively differ-
ent from anything that provinces could achieve without interference by 
the federal level in order for the federal competence to exist. It should be 
emphasised that the described interpretation concerns exclusive power 
of the Canadian Parliament to regulate trade and commerce, while the 
EU power to regulate the internal market is shared between the Union 
and the Member States. So, the Supreme Court seems to be more con-
cerned about the constitutional competences of the provinces than the 
Court of Justice about the competences of the EU Member States.
7 The Canadian healthcare system 
The Canadian health system is predominantly ﬁ nanced from the 
public purse. Approximately 70% of health costs are ﬁ nanced by way of 
general taxation of the territorial, provincial and federal governments. 
The system is highly decentralised, which is, inter alia, caused by the pro-
vincial and territorial responsibility for the delivery and funding of most 
health services.34 This can be seen in the explicit provision of Section 92 
33  Reference re Securities Act (n 31) paras 62, 127.
34  See G Marchildon, Canada: Health System Review (World Health Organisation 2013) 19.
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of the Constitution Act 1867, whereby the maintenance, establishment 
and management of hospitals falls within the scope of the provinces’ 
legislative competence. The remaining power to regulate healthcare pro-
vision is derived from the more general constitutional framework which 
divides power between the provinces and the federal government. Thus, 
the residual power to regulate areas not within the explicit competence 
of the provinces rests with the federal government,
The ﬁ rst area of healthcare where the federal government exercises 
its authority concerns medicines. Several acts determine prohibitions 
and penalties, but in practice operate as regulatory statutes aimed at 
protecting public health.35 Among other things, these federal rules (the 
Food and Drugs Act) set approval processes and standards for the pro-
duction, testing, packaging and labelling of medicines. Applications for 
approval to market medicines in Canada are processed by the Health 
Products and Food Branch. Medicines must also be approved by the 
provinces in order to be covered by their health insurance.36
The second area of healthcare (which is the focus of this paper) in 
which the federal government plays an important role concerns funding, 
through the national single-payer healthcare system.37 The power to reg-
ulate the said issue stems from Section 91 of the Constitution Act 1867 
which provides that:
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, 
and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming 
within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the 
Legislatures of the Provinces.
Additionally, Section 91 gives power to the federal parliament to reg-
ulate taxation and public property. The crucial legal source in this re-
spect is the Canada Health Act.
The Canada Health Act, in its sections 7-12, prescribes the require-
ments for a provincial health insurance system to qualify for federal 
funding. These consist of ﬁ ve rather simple and straightforward criteria:
35  See Food and Drugs Act RSC, 1985, c F-27; Controlled Drugs and Substances Act SC 
1996, c 19; Criminal Code RSC, 1985, c C-46.
36  See R Bouchard et al, ‘The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: 
Who’s Leading Whom?’ (2009) 24 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1461; P Carter, ‘Federal 
Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada’ (1999) 21 Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 215; S Hwang et al, ‘Universal Health 
Insurance and Health Care Access for Homeless Persons’ (2010) 100 American Journal of 
Public Health 1454.
37  Based on the Canada Health Act RSC, 1985, c C-6.
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a)  The ﬁ rst criterion of public administration, prescribed by Section 
8, requires the following: the provincial health insurance system 
must be operated and administered on a non-proﬁ t basis by a 
public authority which is appointed or designated by the provin-
cial government of the province; the public authority in question 
must be responsible to the provincial government for the said is-
sue; the public authority in question must be subject to the audit 
of its accounts by a legally empowered authority. 
b)  The second criterion of comprehensiveness, prescribed by Section 
9, requires that the provincial health insurance system must in-
sure all insured health services which are provided by hospitals, 
medical practitioners or dentists, as well as the prescribed simi-
lar or additional services. 
c)  The third criterion of universality, prescribed by Section 10, re-
quires that the insurance system must entitle the entire provin-
cial population to the insured healthcare services under uniform 
terms and conditions. 
d)  The fourth criterion of portability, prescribed by Section 11, means 
that the provincial health insurance system must not impose a 
minimum period of residence in the said province, or a waiting 
period longer than three months before residents of the province 
are entitled to insured health services. Secondly, the system in 
question must cover the cost of insured health services provided 
to insured persons while temporarily absent from the province on 
the basis that where the insured health services are provided in 
Canada, costs are covered according to the tariffs of the province 
of treatment (unless the provinces in question make a different 
arrangement) and where the insured health services are provid-
ed out of Canada, costs are covered according to the tariffs of 
the province in which the person is insured. Thirdly, the health 
insurance system must provide for the payment, during any min-
imum period of residence, or any waiting period, imposed by the 
healthcare insurance system of another province, of the cost of 
insured healthcare services provided to persons who have ceased 
to be insured persons by reason of having become residents of 
that other province, on the same basis as though they still reside 
in the (ﬁ rst) province. Prior approval by the provincial authority 
may be required for elective treatments outside the province if the 
treatment in question was available on a similar basis within the 
province.
e) The ﬁ fth criterion of accessibility, prescribed by Section 12, im-
poses several requirements. First, the provincial health insur-
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ance system must provide for services under uniform terms and 
conditions and must not impede or preclude, either directly or 
indirectly through charges or otherwise, reasonable access to 
those services by insured persons. Second, the system in ques-
tion must provide for payment for insured services in accordance 
with a tariff authorised by the law of the province. Third, the 
health insurance system of the province must provide for reason-
able compensation for all insured healthcare treatments. Fourth, 
the provincial system in question must provide for the payment 
to hospitals, including those hospitals owned or operated by the 
state, in respect of the cost of insured health treatments.
It is clear that the role of the federal government in relation to pro-
vincial health insurance systems is rather different from the role of the 
EU in relation to Member States’ social security health systems. The 
federal government provides for about one quarter of the ﬁ nancing of 
provincial health insurance systems.38 This ﬁ nancing is subject to strict 
conditions, based on the solidarity and universality of the healthcare 
provisions. In this sense, the federal government acts as an authority 
which oversees whether the provincial systems are based on social con-
siderations, with medical need being the crucial criterion for healthcare 
provision. The money transfer and control over the social nature of the 
healthcare system by the central government are two important charac-
teristics of the Canadian legal framework which differentiate it from the 
EU. These differences will be further elaborated in the following sections.
8 Charter of rights and freedoms 
The previous sections analysed the Canadian legal framework deal-
ing explicitly with access to healthcare, with a focus on the division of 
powers between the federal government and the provinces. Another im-
portant legal source which has, in recent years, been instrumental in 
changing the landscape of healthcare provision in Canada is the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter protects the rights 
and freedoms prescribed by its provisions subject only to those reason-
able limits which are set by law as can be demonstrably justiﬁ ed in a 
democratic and free society. As stated in Oakes by the Supreme Court,39 
the said limitation entails, essentially, a proportionality test, consist-
ing of three parts. First, the measure in question must be fair and not 
arbitrary, designed to achieve the stated objective and connected with 
it. Second it must limit the right in question as little as possible. Final-
38  Marchildon (n 34) 61.
39  See R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.
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ly, proportionality between the measure’s effects and it objective must 
exist.40 This basic structure is generally the same as in the previously 
mentioned case law of the Court of Justice with an exception concerning 
some EU cases dealing with healthcare, as shown above, but its concrete 
implementation may vary between different individual cases. Healthcare 
is not explicitly mentioned in the Charter but some of its provisions have 
had an important role in terms of access to healthcare. One of these 
provisions is contained within Section 7 of the Charter which reads that 
‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice’.
The most famous case concerning access to healthcare relating to 
Section 7 of the Charter is Chaoulli, decided by the Supreme Court. The 
case has been extensively analysed in the literature,41 so this paper will 
focus on its most important repercussions. The question concerned pro-
hibition by Quebec of private insurance for healthcare services provided 
through public (provincial) health insurance. A similar prohibition exist-
ed in ﬁ ve other provinces as well.42 This prohibition was challenged by 
George Zeliotis, who had to wait nine months for a hip operation (similar 
to Watts mentioned earlier), as being contrary to the Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms of Quebec43 and the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. 
The Supreme Court found the Quebec prohibition to be contrary to 
the Quebec Charter, while it was split three-three concerning the Cana-
dian Charter (Justice Deschamps did not rule on the Canadian Charter). 
The ﬁ rst reason for the prohibition to be unconstitutional can be sum-
marised by the following:  
40  The Charter is a part of the Constitutional Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. On the propor-
tionality test in Canada, see, for example, D Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and Ger-
man Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 383. The 
principle of subsidiarity is also present in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, although not 
explicitly prescribed within the constitutional framework. See Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act [2010] 3 SCR 457.
41  See Jacques Chaoulli v Attorney General of Quebec [2005] 1 SCR. See also, for example, 
M Cousins, ‘Health Care and Human Rights after Auton and Chaoulli’ (2009) 54 McGill Law 
Journal 717; C Flood, K Roach and L Sossin, Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal 
Debate over Private Health Insurance in Canada (University of Toronto Press 2005); C Flood 
and S Lewis, ‘Courting Trouble: The Supreme Court’s Embrace of Private Health Insurance’ 
(2005) 1 Healthcare Policy 26; C Flood and X Sujith, ‘Health Care Rights in Canada: The 
Chaoulli Legacy’ in A den Exter (ed), International Health Law: Solidarity and Justice in 
Health Care (Maklu 2008) 97.
42  Flood and Sujith (n 41) 97.
43  Charter of Rights and Freedoms, c 12.
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The Canada Health Act, the Health Insurance Act, and the Hospital In-
surance Act do not expressly prohibit private health services. However, 
they limit access to private health services by removing the ability to 
contract for private health care insurance to cover the same services 
covered by public insurance. The result is a virtual monopoly for the 
public health scheme. The state has effectively limited access to private 
health care except for the very rich, who can afford private care with-
out need of insurance. This virtual monopoly, on the evidence, results 
in delays in treatment that adversely affect the citizen’s security of the 
person. Where a law adversely affects life, liberty or security of the per-
son, it must conform to the principles of fundamental justice. This law, 
in our view, fails to do so.44
Furthermore:
The evidence adduced at trial establishes that many western democra-
cies that do not impose a monopoly on the delivery of health care have 
successfully delivered to their citizens medical services that are superi-
or to and more affordable than the services that are presently available 
in Canada. This demonstrates that a monopoly is not necessary or even 
related to the provision of quality public health care.45
The reasoning above is based on the conclusions that the public 
insurance monopoly causes waiting lists which would be reduced if free-
dom to obtain private insurance existed. Additionally, this kind of mo-
nopoly results in a system which is inferior to other western countries’ 
health systems. These assumptions, with little or no empirical evidence, 
have been disproven in the literature. A public system providing health 
treatments to all insured persons on the basis of need instead of ability to 
pay is contrary to the very notion of a monopoly controlling prices which 
makes consumers worse off in the process.46 Also, countries which allow 
private health insurance (like the UK) have traditionally battled waiting 
lists, as shown when discussing EU case law on free movement of ser-
vices. Further, no empirical proof that the Canadian healthcare system 
is generally inferior to other western countries has been provided, and 
these kinds of comparisons always depend on the choice of factors taken 
into account.47
44  Chaoulli (n 41) para 106.
45  ibid, para 140.
46  Flood and Sujith (n 41) 99.
47  Concerning the proportionality of the contested measure, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the government has not proved that the measure minimally limits protected rights, 
since a wide variety of measures are available to governments, based on the examples of 
other countries.
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Putting the arguments for and against aside, the judgment is im-
portant in that it has focused on the individual’s right to healthcare 
as a human right protected by human rights documents (in this case, 
primarily the provincial one). This approach neglects other aspects a 
social healthcare system needs to take into account. Crucially, the major 
beneﬁ ciaries of the majority reasoning are those persons who are able to 
afford private health insurance. Furthermore, possibilities to exit from 
a public system tend to reduce the resources available to those (who are 
not so well-off as to be able to afford to exit and enter private insurance) 
who remain. Those who suffer the most in these kinds of cases are elder-
ly patients with chronical illnesses who either cannot enter private in-
surance,48 or have to pay enormous premiums to beneﬁ t from the latter. 
It can be seen that, in this case, the reasoning of the majority (concern-
ing the provincial Charter) of the Supreme Court has shifted towards a 
more market-oriented approach with the potential of undermining the 
social fabric of provincial healthcare regulation based on solidarity.
The Supreme Court in Chaoulli dealt with the possibility to contract 
private insurance for healthcare treatments provided through public 
health insurance. Another issue which came to the fore is whether there 
exists a positive duty for the government to cover particular health treat-
ments. The said question arose in Auton,49 regarding Section 15(1) of the 
Charter which reads that:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to 
the equal protection and equal beneﬁ t of the law without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.50 
In this case, a group of children diagnosed with autism and their 
parents claimed that the Province of British Columbia had violated their 
rights under Section 15(1) by refusing to fund a particular treatment for 
autism which they claimed was medically required. 
The Supreme Court in its judgment interpreted both the Canada 
Health Act and the provincial legislation. According to the Court, the 
principle of universality prescribed by the Canada Health Act requires 
a provincial health insurance system to provide one hundred percent 
48  See C Newdick, ‘Preserving Social Citizenship in Health Care Markets: There May Be 
Trouble Ahead’ (2008) 2 McGill Journal of Law and Health 105.
49  See Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2003] 3 SCR 657.
50  See on this case, for example, C Bond, ‘Section 15 of the Charter and the Allocation of 
Resources in Health Care: A Comment on Auton v British Columbia’ (2005) 13 Health Law 
Journal 253; Cousins (n 41); M Finley, ‘Limiting Section 15(1) in the Health Care Context: 
The Impact of Auton v British Columbia’ (2005) 63 University of Toronto Faculty of Law 
Review 213.
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of qualiﬁ ed provincial residents with insured healthcare services un-
der uniform terms and conditions. Insured health services are ‘hospi-
tal services, physician services and surgical-dental services provided 
to insured persons’. Hospital services are ‘medically necessary’ services 
which are provided at a hospital, while physician services are ‘medi-
cally required services rendered by medical practitioners’. The principle 
of comprehensiveness requires a provincial health insurance system to 
‘insure all insured health services provided by hospitals, medical prac-
titioners or dentists, and where the law of the province so permits, sim-
ilar or additional services rendered by other health care practitioners’. 
Therefore, the Canada Health Act prescribes that provincial health in-
surance systems have to cover health services provided by hospitals and 
physicians, but leaves the decision on whether to cover other services to 
the province. The ﬁ rst are deemed ‘core services’ (services provided by 
physicians), and the second ‘non-core services’ (services not provided by 
physicians). The relevant provincial authority has statutory discretion to 
add core beneﬁ ts since they are provided by medical practitioners. If the 
authority is satisﬁ ed that the service in question is medically required 
and provided by a physician, it may add this service to the list of covered 
services.51
It may be inferred from the judgment that the Supreme Court con-
siders both core and non-core services to be beneﬁ ts provided by law. 
The competent authority has the legal discretion to decide which of the 
core or non-core services will be covered by the provincial health insur-
ance system as medically required services.52 The Supreme Court went 
on to conclude that a legislative scheme is not by itself discriminatory if 
it provides coverage for non-core services only for some patients and not 
for others. The scheme in question represented a partial health plan and, 
by deﬁ nition, did not aim to meet all the medical needs of all patients.53 
The next issue concerned was whether the provincial government 
excluded autistic children from coverage on the basis of disability. Here, 
the Court stated that the appropriate comparator for the claimants is a 
non-disabled person, or a person with a disability which is not a mental 
disability, seeking or receiving funding for a non-core treatment which is 
important for the present and future health of the said person, is emer-
gent and has only recently begun to be recognised as medically required. 
The claimants were not denied a treatment made available to the com-
parator group and there was no discrimination.54
51  Auton (n 49), Appendix B.
52  Finley (n 50) 223.
53  Auton (n 49), para 43.
54  Ibid, para 8.
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The approach by the Supreme Court leaves the crucial autonomy to 
determine public healthcare coverage to the (provincial) legislature. In 
that sense, it refrains from making a policy choice on which treatments 
are to be covered from the public purse.55 The said case law shows strong 
restraint from engaging into judicial activism sometimes observed in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in some cases concerning cross-bor-
der healthcare. Importantly, there is no mention of some universal health 
standards which determine whether a certain treatment falls within a 
loose and general legislative deﬁ nition of coverage. On the other hand, 
unlike the social health insurance systems provided by Member States 
of the EU, the scheme in question was partial since it included non-core 
services where more signiﬁ cant discretion of the provinces existed.
A case factually more similar to the Court of Justice’s case law was 
Flora.56 The patient in question had contracted hepatitis C which result-
ed in a liver cancer. He was not a suitable candidate for a liver transplant 
in Ontario and instead underwent successful treatment to contain the 
growth and decrease the size of the existing tumours and received a liv-
er transplantation procedure at a hospital in the UK. He subsequently 
applied for reimbursement to Ontario public authorities. The reimburse-
ment was refused and the refusal was challenged in front of the Ontario 
Divisional Court and, on appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The Ontario legislation provided that a person is entitled to coverage 
of foreign treatment when the treatment in question is generally accepted 
by the medical profession in Ontario as appropriate for a patient in the 
same medical circumstances as the patient in question; the treatment 
is medically necessary; either the identical or equivalent treatment is 
not performed in Ontario or the identical or equivalent treatment is per-
formed in Ontario, but it is necessary for the person to travel abroad to 
avoid a delay that would result in death or medically signiﬁ cant irrevers-
ible damage to the patient.57
The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. In terms of the reasonable-
ness of the decision, it concluded that it fell within the range of accept-
able outcomes which are defensible on the facts and the law and that 
the justiﬁ cation was transparent, sound, and intelligible. The explicit 
legislative provision that the treatment in question must be generally 
accepted in Ontario was crucial. The question whether a treatment was 
accepted in medical circles elsewhere was not considered relevant.58 This 
55  Bond (n 50) 271.
56  See Flora v General Manager, Ontario Health Insurance Plan, [2008] 91 O.R. (3d) 412.
57  Ibid.
58  ibid.
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approach is in stark contrast to the (already mentioned) approach of the 
Court of Justice applied in Geraets-Smits, where international standards 
are relevant when determining whether a treatment is covered or not.59 
The other ground of appeal concerned Section 7 of the Charter. Re-
lated to this, the Court of Appeal stated that the provincial legislation’s 
conditions for funding treatment abroad do not prohibit or impede any-
one from seeking health treatment. The said rules do not limit the types 
of healthcare services available to Ontarians, nor do they represent gov-
ernmental interference with an existing right. By not providing coverage 
for all treatments abroad, the provincial legislation does not deprive a 
person of the rights protected by Section 7 of the Charter. Finally, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that there is no positive right to a minimum 
level of healthcare guaranteed by the Charter.60 
It can be stated that the case law favours personal rights over so-
cial legislation (set primarily by the provinces) in some instances. A dif-
ference between Chaoulli where that was evident and other case law is 
that the former was about freedom to access private health insurance, 
while the latter was about a positive duty of the government to cover cer-
tain health treatments. Although this distinction seems a little artiﬁ cial 
in terms of reasoning based on improving the overall access to health-
care,61 it has practically signiﬁ cantly limited individual rights to access 
healthcare. If one compares the approach of the Canadian courts to the 
Court of Justice of the EU, a more conservative stance can be observed. 
The Canadian approach generally leaves policy decisions to the provin-
cial governments, allowing them to limit available health treatments to 
those provided and recognised domestically. In this way, funding and 
rationing decisions can be made in accordance with domestic priorities 
and resources. 
The approach by the Court of Justice results, for example, in Mem-
ber States having to cover foreign treatments not provided domestically 
if these treatments fall within the broad national legislative deﬁ nitions 
of covered healthcare. These legislative deﬁ nitions thereby have an un-
intended consequence of extending the national coverage to treatments 
which are normal and recognised in some other country’s health sys-
tem. The mentioned approach is unlike the stance of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in Flora whereby only treatments recognised domestically are 
relevant. National legislators are thus provided with an incentive to use 
detailed exhaustive lists of covered treatments in order to achieve the 
59  See Geraets-Smits (n 18) paras 94-98.
60  ibid.
61  Cousins (n 41) 726.
182 Tomislav Sokol: The Right to Healthcare in the European Union and Canada
goal of limiting coverage to treatments which are considered normal do-
mestically. Their autonomy is thereby curtailed by the Court of Justice 
to some extent. It needs to be mentioned that this aspect of the case 
law has not so far resulted in systemic legislative reforms on the part of 
the Member States. It can be assumed that the reason for this is that 
cross-border healthcare is a marginal phenomenon, with only 0.05% of 
EU citizens obtaining healthcare abroad on the basis of the Patients’ 
Rights Directive as a codiﬁ cation of the case law.62 One of the reasons for 
this is that people generally prefer health treatment in settings familiar 
to them.63 Still, the case law has affected national regulatory autonomy 
by creating incentives to change the way health coverage is legally de-
ﬁ ned, which may become practically more relevant depending on patient 
movements in the future. 
9 Lessons to be learned? 
There are similarities and differences between the ways the right 
to healthcare is implemented in the EU and Canada. In both systems, 
the main competences to organise the delivery of healthcare rest with 
their constituent parts (Member States/provinces). The bulk of this pro-
vision is organised via social health insurance, based on principles such 
as public administration, universality and accessibility. However, this is 
where the differences already start. It seems that the European Union 
acts as a regulatory state, using its powers in the area of the internal 
market to curb Member States’ autonomy to organise their health in-
surance systems. This has been evident in the area of free movement of 
healthcare services, where the case law of the Court of Justice, codiﬁ ed 
via secondary legislation, gives the individual’s right to particular health 
treatment priority over the needs of the system to allocate resources 
where they are most needed. In this way, persons who are able to pay 
upfront for the treatment costs and settle other related expenses, such 
as travel and accommodation, are privileged compared to elderly and 
less well-off patients who are either unable to travel longer distances or 
do not have enough resources to pay for the treatment and request sub-
sequent reimbursement. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the 
described freedom has been somewhat curtailed by the more recent case 
law of the Court of Justice and the Patients’ Rights Directive (thanks 
to some Member States in the Council). As mentioned in the previous 
62  See European Court of Auditors, ‘EU Actions for Cross-border Healthcare: Signiﬁ cant 
Ambitions but Improved Management Required’ (2019) 4. See also Patients’ Rights Directive 
(n 13).
63  See S Greer, ‘The Three Faces of European Union Health Policy: Policy, Markets, and 
Austerity’ (2014) 33 Policy and Society 13, 16. 
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sections, this development has transpired by expanding the deﬁ nition of 
treatments for which prior authorisation is required when compared to 
the earliest judgments.
Still, the use of vague notions such as international medical stan-
dards entitles the mentioned privileged individuals to the best possible 
healthcare anywhere in the EU (which can ﬁ t into the broad legisla-
tive deﬁ nition of coverage), even though a particular treatment is not 
recognised and, as such, practically not covered in the state of health 
insurance. Such an approach disrupts the balance between the various 
ethical and ﬁ nancial choices national systems have to make when deter-
mining the health services they cover. In this sense, it can be stated that 
the EU’s role is that it facilitates the right to healthcare for one category 
of persons but makes the position of the other category harder by divert-
ing resources to the ﬁ rst one. 
All this is not currently a big practical issue due to the small extent 
of patient mobility, but may potentially become a more important issue 
depending on future trends in patient mobility, due to potential future ﬁ -
nancial crises, greater awareness of the possibilities the EU law provides 
to individuals, the national judiciary, and similar factors. As stated by 
Sindbjerg Martinsen and Vrangbaek, ‘further evolution depends on the 
response to these developments by European citizens, private interests 
and national courts’. Certainly, a supportive institutional structure to 
expand rights stemming from EU law now exists and, unless Member 
State policy makers act in consort to de-institutionalise the emerging in-
ternal healthcare market, the EU inﬂ uence on future health governance 
(its Europeanisation) will probably increase.64
Additionally, the European Union has created a strong legal frame-
work on economic policy coordination, aiming primarily at imposing ﬁ s-
cal discipline upon the Member States. As stated by Scott Greer, ‘To mar-
ket compliance we now add ﬁ scal compliance’.65 This system has been 
further strengthened by the economic crisis and has resulted in reducing 
public healthcare expenditure, along with reforms which have, at least 
partially, striven for the introduction of market principles into nation-
al healthcare systems (privatisation, the increase of co-payments and 
the like). Importantly, forums of ﬁ nance ministries rather than health 
experts are increasingly shaping the area with their own sets of (ﬁ scal) 
priorities.66 The described setup makes it harder for individuals to exer-
cise their right to healthcare. This is especially the case for those who 
64  See D Sindbjerg Martinsen and K Vrangbaek, ‘The Europeanization of Health Care Gov-
ernance’ (2008) 86 Public Administration 169. 
65  See Greer (n 63) 22.
66  ibid 22. 
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are underprivileged in a way that they are not able to pay by themselves 
for needed healthcare services. The limited competences of the Union to 
concretely inﬂ uence national healthcare systems, apart from the men-
tioned marketisation of healthcare provision, mean that the situation is 
not likely to change under the current EU constitutional framework.
This relationship in Canada is, at least partially, the opposite. The 
central government legally prescribes the basic social principles that 
the provincial health insurance systems must adhere to. Of course, the 
Canadian federal government has the legitimacy to do this because it 
ﬁ nances part of the provincial health insurance expenses from the cen-
tral budget. This redistributive role of the centre concerning healthcare 
is practically non-existent in the EU, which essentially tells the Member 
States what to do with their own money, according to the market rules 
on free movement and economic policy coordination. Similar attempts 
have been made to introduce an individual market-oriented approach in 
Canadian provincial health insurance systems, but the Canadian courts 
have proved more reluctant to go down that alley than the Court of Jus-
tice of the EU. This can be seen as part of a generally more restrained 
jurisprudence by the Canadian Supreme Court, in terms of allowing the 
central level to interfere with the areas where the provinces have the cru-
cial role to play, than that of the Court of Justice of the EU.
It can be argued, on the basis of the analysis shown above, that 
the European Union could take a few lessons from Canada in terms of 
facilitating the right to healthcare, understood as access to healthcare 
services in accordance with uniform, objective criteria based on clinical 
need instead of the ability to pay. This state of play reﬂ ects the consti-
tutional asymmetry of the EU. The European integration process has 
traditionally been dominated by the economic interests of market liber-
alisation and the national social policies (including healthcare) needed 
to be adjusted to those interests in the areas where conﬂ icts occur.67 
The same pattern can be observed in the area of healthcare. Here, free 
movement of well-off patients has been promoted by the Court of Justice 
and EU legislation to some extent, to the detriment of national policy 
choices prioritising resources on the basis of healthcare need instead 
of the ability to pay. To overcome this problem, the promotors of ‘social 
Europe’, who want to ensure the effectiveness of Member States’ social 
systems, are faced with a choice: either to develop social programmes at 
the European level or harmonise national systems of social protection, 
including health insurance. However, the diversity of these national sys-
tems (in terms of organisation and ﬁ nancing) and their political salience 
67  See F Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ 
(2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 647. 
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make it virtually impossible for the Member States to agree on common 
European solutions.68 As Scott Greer put it: ‘adding a health treaty 
base might improve the health effects of EU legislation at the price of 
producing more EU action, while leaving no health treaty base might 
slow and limit EU action but at the price of ensuring it is justiﬁ ed by 
internal market law’.69
The Canadian example illustrates a possible solution to the de-
scribed difﬁ culty. Although different in many ways, EU Member States’ 
health systems do share a set of common values of solidarity, equity, 
and access to good quality care and universality, as mentioned above. 
It can be seen that these values generally correspond to the require-
ments set by Canadian federal legislation for the provincial health in-
surance systems to obtain federal funding. Hence, it can be argued that 
a similar approach to the Canadian one could be applied in Europe: 
partial funding for the national systems provided by the EU, condi-
tional upon respect of the social values these systems are based on. 
The principles of solidarity and universality, as well as the fact that 
government spending is predominant in ensuring access to healthcare, 
are crucial in this respect. Therefore, there is no rational reason why 
differences in the ways of funding national systems (reimbursement v 
beneﬁ ts-in-kind provided free-of-charge at the point of delivery) should 
affect the proposal. 
The mentioned proposal could be implemented if one crucial condi-
tion was met: Member States’ contributions to the Union budget would 
have to be raised. According to Article 311 TFEU, the Council decides 
unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament on how to 
deﬁ ne the system of own resources of the EU. It may set new catego-
ries of own resources or abolish an existing category. Member States 
need to approve such a decision in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. Since, under Article 6 TFEU, the EU has competence to 
support and supplement Member States’ activities in the area of health 
protection, it can be claimed that ﬁ nancial support for national health 
insurance systems falls within the said area of competence. 
As prescribed by Articles 311-324 TFEU, the annual budget needs 
to be in accordance with the multiannual ﬁ nancial framework which 
is established for a minimum period of ﬁ ve years. The Council, after 
obtaining consent from the European Parliament, adopts the multian-
nual ﬁ nancial framework regulation by way of consensus. Currently, the 
biggest share of expenditure is allocated for reducing economic gaps be-
68  ibid 652. 
69  See Greer (n 63) 17. 
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tween different regions of the EU. Rural development, agriculture, envi-
ronmental protection and ﬁ sheries also represent a major share of Union 
spending.70 
Of course, achieving consensus between EU Member States is not an 
easy task, especially for the countries who contribute most to the Union 
budget. On the other hand, resources paid into the EU budget would cov-
er only part of health expenditure, which would make it more ﬁ nancially 
bearable. Also, a formula according to which the return would be close 
to proportional to the amounts paid would probably have to be developed 
through Member States’ negotiations (with some level of solidarity with 
the less developed parts of the Union).71 There are several beneﬁ ts to this 
approach. First, the EU would acquire more legitimacy to have a regu-
latory inﬂ uence on Member States’ health systems. Second, the division 
of competences would become clearer than now, thus contributing to 
legal certainty. Third, the right to healthcare for all categories of persons 
would be protected. If social values and the market are placed on the 
same constitutional footing at the EU level, the Court of Justice could 
more easily balance between them in individual cases, without priori-
tising some groups of patients over others. It is true that this approach 
would warrant a unanimous Council decision, but this intervention 
would be limited, without allowing full harmonisation of national health 
(insurance) systems. Of course, there are practical differences between 
the European Union and Canada, not limited to the fact that Canada is 
a single nation and in that sense is obviously more homogeneous than 
70  See Europa, ‘How the EU Budget Is Spent’ (2018). 
71  It should be mentioned that there has been a proposal from the European Commission 
to tie funding from the European Union budget to the protection of the rule of law in indi-
vidual Member States. The proposal is that Union measures against a ‘problematic’ Member 
be based on a decision by the Council following a proposal from the European Commission. 
See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deﬁ ciencies as regards the 
rule of law in the Member States’ COM (2018) 324 ﬁ nal, art 5. There are several problems 
here. First, Article 322(1)(a) TFEU prescribes that regulations may be adopted, via ordinary 
legislative procedure, regarding the ﬁ nancial rules which determine particularly the proce-
dure to be adopted for establishing and implementing the Union budget and for presenting 
and auditing accounts. There is no mention of the rule of law and responsibility in this 
primary law provision and it is very hard to infer it, since the rule of law is regulated by 
other Treaty provisions, namely its Article 7. The procedure prescribed by Article 7 requires 
unanimity by other Member States when deciding on the existence of a persistent and se-
rious breach by a Member State of the values the European Union is based on. Only after 
that would suspension of a Member State’s Treaty rights be possible. Such a decision would 
represent an extreme course of action and the prescribed procedure and majority required 
should not be circumvented by using Treaty provisions not related to the principles of the 
rule of law. Finally, presumption in favour of a negative decision (proposed by the Com-
mission), whereby a qualiﬁ ed majority is needed to decide the opposite, surely disrupts the 
balance of power between the Council and the Commission in favour of the Commission.
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the EU. This means that adopting the Canadian approach would face a 
lot of practical opposition within the Union setting, notwithstanding the 
beneﬁ ts of this approach for health policy as a whole. However, in the 
other case, the Europeanisation of healthcare governance would be con-
tinuously torn between national and Union regulatory competence with 
all the problems this situation entails, as described above.
10  CONCLUSION 
The primary responsibility to ensure the right to healthcare in 
complex entities like the EU and Canada rests with the level of their 
constituent parts. In cases where the central level actually contributes 
resources to enable the practical implementation of that right, it is in 
a position to legally protect the social character of healthcare provision 
and facilitate the exercise of the said right for all persons based on 
universal criteria. In cases where the central level acts as a market-ori-
ented regulatory entity, healthcare systems lose their balance, and 
the exercise of the right to healthcare is facilitated only for privileged 
groups with signiﬁ cant economic resources. It is impossible to correct 
this imbalance existing in the EU without changing its constitutional 
framework and ﬁ nancial setup. 
Partial funding of national health insurance systems could provide 
the Union with the legitimacy to take part in regulating those systems 
and strengthen the principles of solidarity and universality that every-
one is (at least formally) so attached to. Alternatively, the current pro-
cess of the Europeanisation of healthcare policy and governance would 
remain in a state of tension between national and EU regulatory compe-
tence with all the difﬁ culties this involves, as illustrated in this paper.
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Table 1: EU and Canada table of comparison
European Union Canada
Constitutional 
provisions related to 
healthcare 
concurrent and 
supportive powers of 
the EU
exclusive powers of the 
provinces
Legal basis for central-
level legislation
broad powers of the EU 
as interpreted by the 
Court of Justice
restrained approach 
by the Supreme Court 
− genuinely national 
issues
Financing Member States’ 
funding which needs 
to adhere to economic 
conditionality
provincial funding with 
partial funding from 
the federal government 
on the condition of 
adherence to social 
principles








international standards domestic standards
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